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1. Introduction 
Historiography on Spanish colonial trade emphasizes the essential role 
played in the Spanish expansion in the Atlantic by non-Hispanic mer-
cantile networks settled in the port cities of the Iberian Peninsula. 
Communities of foreign merchants, mostly Anglo-Irish, French, Flem-
ish, and Dutch, lived in the Iberian Peninsula and enjoyed a prosper-
ous trade at the main urban nuclei. The port city of Cadiz had a para-
digmatic functionality as a crossing point for several maritime routes. 
Various studies have highlighted the prosperity reached by Cadiz and 
by so many other cities on the Spanish shore. Different communities 
of foreign merchants had settled there, to a lesser or a greater extent, 
mainly during the second half of the 17th century and throughout the 
18th century. Due to the very nature of certain urban centers such as 
Bilbao or Malaga, foreign colonies had a considerable impact on the 
evolution and development of the economic relationship between the 
North of Europe and the South of the Iberian Peninsula. This is clearly 
shown, especially, in the influence that Southern Spain had on the 
Atlantic markets. It is worth highlighting that, in the most recent histo-
riography, we have moved from studying those colonies in situ to 
analyzing them as actors and factors in a process of spatial and re-
gional integration spreading beyond all national borders.1 The com-
plexity of the networks, finely interwoven by the various colonies of 
merchants of different nationalities in and around American and Span-
                                                     
∗  Translated by Ernesto Alconchel Guido. This investigation has been done in 
the Project: Nations and Communities: Comparative Perspectives in Atlantic 
Europe: 1650-1830, Plan Nacional I+D, 2006 HUM-01679/Ministerio de Cien-
cia e Innovación (Spanish Ministery of Sciences and Innovation). 
1  See Klein/Veluwenkamp (1993: 27-55); Crespo Solana (2001; 2002: 446-467); 
Weber (2004); Bustos Rodríguez (2005); García Fernández (2005).  
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ish markets and ports, deserves a deeper investigation. Such an inves-
tigation should aim at studying the role played by the mercantile ac-
tors who built the foundations supporting the different monopolies. 
Such monopolies were created by a multitude of trade companies 
thriving in some heavily competitive markets. These companies were 
swayed by shifting winds that affected the social fabric at political, 
social and economic levels. 
Based on the example of the Dutch merchant community in Cadiz, 
this paper seeks to outline the role played by these communities in the 
Spanish Atlantic expansion. In order to do so, we have taken into ac-
count the strategies of the colonies businessmen (extensively dealt 
with in my own works), and we have analyzed the major connections 
with those American ports reached via Cadiz. With that in mind, we 
will also try to offer a comparison between direct trade from Amster-
dam to several American ports, mainly in the Caribbean, and trade 
carried out via Cadiz. We will describe the nature of this trade from 
Cadiz and its connection with various American cities. There are a 
number of reasons for choosing a specific chronological frame, in 
which factors of a political, social and economic character converge. 
A general assessment can be made between 1648 and 1778. Such a 
long period also meant a transition between centuries. It is a long pe-
riod of crisis, in its etymological sense. A series of warlike conflicts 
caused certain structural changes of an economic nature. At the same 
time, well into the second half of the 17th century and throughout the 
enlightened 18th century, the old enemies of the Hispanic Monarchy 
had devised some sophisticated trading mechanisms between Spain 
and America. It was due, mainly, to the fact that the south of the Ibe-
rian Peninsula and the Baltic regions were highly complementary and 
mutually dependent areas, combined with the particular importance of 
Dutch transport in the exchange between both areas. In the same way, 
the complicity between Dutch merchants and the Flemish colony of 
Southern Andalusia (the latter being thoroughly integrated into the 
Spanish society), had been central to the routes of these convoys, 
which linked certain northern European ports to southern Spain and 
several American ports. At those American ports, Dutch merchants 
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had appointed agents and partners. Many of them had a Dutch origin; 
among them many Jews could also be found.2  
 
2. Foreign trade in Cadiz: The Dutch case in the 17th century  
But, what was the nature of such trade carried out by Dutch colonies 
in the Hispanic world, and specifically, through the city of Cadiz?  
Since the Truce of the Twelve years (1609), Dutch merchants 
were able to trade with America from Cadiz, Seville, Sanlúcar de  
Barrameda, El Puerto de Santa María and Malaga. They traded in 
cereals, textiles, manufactures from their own Oriental colonies, and 
shipbuilding material, in exchange for spaansee vruchten (Spanish 
fruits, i.e., raisins, fresh fruits, almonds and nuts, etc.) as well as an 
extensive variety of colonial produce from Spanish America, such as 
cochineal and cocoa. But the key years in order to understand their 
favourable position in this trade were between 1655 and 1665, when 
their business grew just as much as did migratory flows into Spain. 
Both the Peace of Munster and the treaties of The Hague in 1673 were 
the landmarks where the Dutch achieved two of their main objectives: 
on the one hand, they were granted by the Spanish Monarchy the right 
to engage in trade with the American ports; on the other hand, they 
were allowed to settle and trade in Spanish cities, and to send ships to 
them (Crespo Solana 2001: 40; Sánchez Belén 2005). According to 
Jonathan Israel, it is a fact that the Dutch stepped into a favorable 
position in the Spanish markets, partly due to the increasing disagree-
ments between Spain and both England and France especially between 
1650 and 1660 (Israel 1990: 189-213). Gaining direct control over the 
access to Spanish markets both in America and in mainland Spain was 
the key issue for Amsterdam commercial firms, as it was the best way 
to ensure the survival of their trade routes and the links between sev-
eral different economic spaces. All this was made possible, too, by 
Spains heavy structural dependence on Dutch commerce. We there-
fore see Cadiz rise as the key center to several markets in the second 
half of the 17th century. Cadiz was also a major port of call in the At-
lantic routes to the Canaries and America.  
                                                     
2  Everaert (1973); Swierenga (1985); Klooster (1998); Crespo Solana (2001); 
Postma/Enthoven (2003).  
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It seems to be a paradox that a great influx of Dutch immigrants 
into Cadiz happened in the second half of the 17th century. Despite the 
fact that hardly any carta de naturaleza or naturalization letters 
were granted by the Casa de la Contratación in that period, a great 
number of commission agents and representatives from the Low 
Countries settled in Cadiz in those years. Many more naturalization 
papers were granted to Flemish than to Dutch citizens, since the latter 
would hardly ever meet the requirements. Very few of such papers 
were granted to the Dutch between 1612 and 1693. The same situation 
happened in the 18th century.3 Besides, there were very few contratos 
de compañía  Company Contracts  signed in Cadiz by Dutch mer-
chants in that period: only seven between 1650 and 1750. That is a 
very small number compared to an overall number of 108 contracts 
signed by merchants of all nationalities (Carrasco González 1997: 
121-129). There is a simple explanation for both facts; Spanish 
sources give little or no information about migration of temporary 
labour force involved in secondary trading and financial activities that 
arrived in Cadiz within a specific framework, i.e., the dienstcontract 
or office contract, which was signed either in the Dutch cities them-
selves or on board the ships bound for Spain. 
This migration process can be put into a social context where sin-
gle, young men born into families of traders and seamen would tem-
porarily leave their homes. A good part of them belonged to a Catho-
lic minority that had emigrated from the southern Low Countries. 
Others were Jews. Most of them would end up in Spanish port cities 
as partners of Flemish or other local merchants, bringing with them a 
dienstcontract that explains their temporary stay. Such a contract 
would enable them to set up an office or warehouse in order to send 
and receive money from Amsterdam and goods for redistribution to-
wards various destinations (Crespo Solana 2000: 25). Despite the suc-
cess of Dutch direct trade with several American ports, Dutch pres-
ence in Cadiz rose during the second half of the 17th century. From the 
Archivo Provincial de Cádiz we see that the migratory influx into 
Cadiz was much more important than Dutch migration to its own 
American enclaves, which was, demographically speaking, a complete 
                                                     
3  Naturalization papers, AGI, CC 50B, 596, and 596B, 51B; AGI, Cons. 445; 
Domínguez Ortiz (1959). 
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failure (Lucassen 1991; Crespo Solana 2001: 139; Emmer 2001: 31-
49). Between 1680 and 1740 approximately, Dutch migration to Cadiz 
increased. In a 1662 census, there is a high number of Dutch taxpayers 
(31), from whom over 11,000 reales de vellón were collected. Both 
Genoans and French came second with 27 individuals in each group; a 
similar amount of taxes was levied. There were 14 Englishmen and 
10 Flemings (Ravina Martín 1976; Oliva Melgar 2004: 83). Although 
most of them were only temporary residents, a few settled and set up 
house and business as they found a favorable social environment. The 
Dutch colony had more than 40 or 50 families.4 In contrast to the 
sparse presence of Dutch merchants in American ports, in Cadiz, their 
presence and commercial activities were of great importance. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to state that, from the sources available to 
us so far, it can be claimed that Dutch trade in the Atlantic has been 
grossly overestimated, and it only meant a small fraction of the overall 
Dutch trade worldwide, since its trade in other regions was 
significantly greater.5 Cadiz was a substantial part of Dutch trade in 
Europe as it was its gateway to America at a time when Mediterranean 
trade was in crisis. 
There are several examples of direct trips of Dutch ships bound for 
Spanish America, without calling at Cadiz. Mainly, their destinations 
were ports in and around the Caribbean and near the ports in Dutch 
colonies. They were also bound for the continent: Portobelo, Car-
tagena de Indias, Buenos Aires and, especially, Caracas. Direct trade 
from Amsterdam was probably used to bring colonial products in high 
demand into Europe, the most highly profitable of all trading activities 
carried out by the Dutch. Such activities were probably complemented 
with indirect trips via Cadiz. The Spanish authorities always fought 
the illicit trade carried out by the Dutch on those direct trips. How-
ever, it is very interesting to notice that foreign trade through and from 
Cadiz was deliberately accepted. By and large, except during certain 
wars, Dutch trade from Cadiz enjoyed a seamless continuity. This was 
due to the economic and social integration of Dutch and Flemish 
colonies in this city (Moutoukias 1989; Crespo Solana 2000: 35). We 
                                                     
4  Testament and Proxies, AHPC, PN, Notarías 5, 9, 15, 19 and 23. In my doctoral 
thesis a complete list can be found (Crespo Solana 1999: Appendix).  
5  Steensgaard (1990: 148-149); Klooster (1995: 207 [I am indebted to the author 
for providing me with the original text of his thesis]; 2003); Enthoven (2003).  
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must know the main features of Dutch trade in Cadiz in the second 
half of the 17th century so as to understand its continuity after Utrecht. 
So far, studying shipping figures was the most reliable way to assess 
trade, as one of the main problems faced by the researcher is the fact 
that sources do not offer reliable data about goods and products. For 
instance, in that period, merchandise would not normally be manufac-
turer stamped. We can only know the ship on which products were 
carried, but not their origin (Sánchez Belén 2005: 165).  
Shipping data, however, have not been processed and analyzed in 
the long durée in the period between Munster and the Free Trade 
agreements signed around 1770, and onwards. Van der Woude, De 
Vries, Sée and Klooster have collected data regarding the second half 
of the 17th century. According to Sánchez Belén, a report by the Span-
ish Consul in Amsterdam at the time, states that 25 vessels from Hol-
land arrived in Cadiz in 1684. Other sources show annual figures be-
tween 100 and 150 ships (Sée 1926: 189-199; Van der Woude/De 
Vries 1995: 476). Such data are incomplete and are not based on the 
one source that is, to my mind, the most reliable of all when assessing 
Dutch sea trade with Cadiz, i.e., the Straatvaart lists.6 Some works 
state that Cadiz did not appeal to Dutch traders since its warehouses 
were overstocked and because of the customs officers zeal. However, 
profits gained through commission commerce helped to mitigate the 
situation. 
It was a fact that Spanish trade with the Indies in the second half 
of the 17th century was not an easy business (Oliva Melgar 2004: 85). 
Besides, French products posed a stiff competition despite being 
banned from an already saturated market. In the 1680s and 1690s, 
imports by Cadiz-based traders slowed down and led the market into a 
crisis that reached its peak at the time of the War of Spanish Succes-
sion (Sánchez Belen 2005: 176). Nevertheless, the very nature of this 
trade would ensure its survival as it was based on produce from tropi-
cal areas which were in very high demand and had to be stocked at the 
                                                     
6  Between 1590 and 1625 the data were collected by the States Generals (Staten 
Generaal). Since it was founded in 1625, the Directie van de Levantse Handel, 
with branches in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hoorn and Middelburg, collected data 
on all ships bound for Cadiz (Heeringa 1917, II). Such data have been systemati-
cally used in my work for the 18th century (Crespo Solana 2000). Sources to be 
found in the NADH, LH Inventaris 1.03.01. 
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European staple markets. Large trading firms were growing increas-
ingly powerful and wealthy owing to speculation at war times and the 
force-feeding of colonial products onto the markets. One of their main 
objectives was to gain control over the routes to the production areas. 
Not only were colonial products transported along these routes, but 
also a wide variety of goods demanded by the growing middle class in 
Europe and America. A great deal of such goods came from Asia: 
generally luxury items such as spice and expensive clothing. Cadiz 
would appeal to Dutch merchants for a number of reasons. One of 
them was American silver. It is widely known that Cadiz was ex-
tremely important as a drainage center for silver from America that 
was redirected to the rest of markets that the Dutch had access to. 
Numerous studies have dealt with the subject, and available figures 
show the ability of the Dutch to obtain large amounts of silver at 
Cadiz port. For instance, in 1682, 3,500,000 pesos in silver were sent 
to Holland. Such figures compare favorably to those for France. Cer-
tain works state that Holland was the main recipient of American sil-
ver, ahead of England and France. Silver was continuously drained 
away throughout the 18th century, but figures vary considerably from 
one year to another (Morineau 1985). 
 
3. Two comparative issues: Direct commerce versus indirect 
commerce 
There were two main routes connecting Holland to the American mar-
kets: What were their characteristics? What profits could be gained 
from them? A qualitative description of the functioning of these routes 
can be made, but a quantitative comparison between Dutch direct 
trade with America and trade via Cadiz still remains beyond our 
means. 
As widely known, there was fierce competition in the American 
markets. The West India Company (West-Indische Compagnie  
WIC) could only survive through smuggling against the aggressive 
commercial policies of the English and the French. Once the Dutch 
started to settle on certain islands of the West Indies, such as Curaçao 
and Sint Eustatius, these became important trading centers where 
smuggling with other colonies was commonplace. The ports in the 
area around the Caribbean were the ones most frequented by Dutch 
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convoys (Arauz Monfante 1984; Aizpurua Aguirre 1993). Apart from 
smuggling, the success of private Dutch commerce throughout the 18th 
century made it possible for firms to reap larger profits from commis-
sion-based trade and scales along the route, mainly at European ports. 
Such trade contributed to the primacy of the Dutch as freighters and 
financiers in the European markets. Even in times of crisis, Dutch 
direct trade with the Caribbean was higher than trade from Cadiz. 
Very high figures were registered between 1701 and 1750 (Klooster 
1998: 73, 207-224). However, by and large, trade via Curaçao was not 
detrimental to Cadiz trade, as direct and indirect routes were actually 
complementary to each other. And their importance was related to the 
ports they were connected to. We can see that, throughout the 18th 
century, Cadiz would link to the destination ports for the fleets, galle-
ons and register ships of the Spanish monopoly even before the mar-
ginal areas of the Caribbean were included in the routes as from 1740. 
As seen in Figure 1 below, Dutch involvement in register ships rose 
significantly in that year, while their involvement in the system of 
fleets and galleons decreased considerably. Conversely, Dutch trade  
 and smuggling  from its enclaves in the West Indies had always 
targeted those areas that had been heavily marginalized by the system 
of fleets and galleons but which had developed strong economies with 
a produce surplus due to their agricultural output. The latter was one 
of the reasons why the Dutch tried to seize Puerto Rico (Vila Vilar 
1974). They also tried to reach agreements with the colonial elites in 
areas such as Panama or Venezuela. Their goal was to gain profits by 
financing local enterprises such as cocoa-producing farms and also by 
securing exclusive rights to transport the goods to Europe and, most 
importantly as this was their most profitable business, to provide them 
with slaves. Exceptionally, the Dutch also traded directly with Cuba 
and Santo Domingo. Nueva Granada was also one of the main areas 
for the Dutch to settle, although profits gained from trade at these 
ports have been overestimated. Dutch presence in these markets re-
sulted in a flagrant violation of the unwritten colonial pact whereby 
overseas territories would not engage in direct trade other than with 
their respective metropolis. Not only Spain, but also France and espe-
cially England were affected by Dutch trade. In fact, England had 
Holland as its main enemy regarding Englands monopoly with its 
own American colonies (Céspedes del Castillo 1983: 361; 1999). 
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Long-term consequences of this direct Dutch trade were more impor-
tant from a functional and structural standpoint than in terms of prof-
its. Dutch freights, highly attractive because of their low cost and their 
readiness and speed, constantly encouraged transit trade in the Carib-
bean both for the Dutch themselves and for other foreign traders. All 
this led to a high development of tropical, single-crop economies and 
their regional economic integration (Goslinga 1985). 
Cadiz trade in the 17th and the 18th centuries was fundamental for 
Dutch commerce in Europe, because Cadiz provided access to various 
interrelated spaces. Besides, American trade became a profitable al-
ternative for the ships of the Mediterranean trade when they went into 
a crisis and had to face fierce competition by the English and the 
Genoans. In certain junctures, Cadiz was a kind of factory of scale 
providing profitable access to American markets. It was a highly suit-
able port of scale for the Dutch, greatly appreciated by them on their 
long transatlantic journeys. As a result, Cadiz was highly appropriate 
for storing goods from various markets, such as Asia Minor, Italy, 
North Africa or Sub-Saharan Africa (ivory was brought into Europe 
through the caravans coming from Africa). The ships of the Dutch 
East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie  VOC) 
also called at Cadiz in order to store products from the Far East. 
Certain Cadiz partners involved in such business trips were Flem-
ish who had settled in the capital of the Spanish monopoly. They had 
appointed agents to carry out the trips, making the actual link between 
the stopovers along a route. We have the example of Diego Albrecht, 
freighter of the ship The Peace that belonged to the firm Guillaume 
Bellin de la Garde. He set sail in 1655 from La Rochelle bound for 
Amsterdam, calling at Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Cartagena de 
Indias, Portobelo and Curaçao. According to Willem W. Klooster, at 
the time, the volume of direct trade between Amsterdam and the His-
panic American colonies was higher than trade through Cadiz, at least 
as far as the actual number of ships is concerned. However, this was a 
peak period for Dutch trade volume through Cadiz, and sailing be-
tween Amsterdam and Cadiz was very abundant, ranging between 150 
and 200 annual ships (Moutoukias 1989: 121; Klooster 1998: 41-58, 
208-220). During the second half of the 17th century, these Dutch-
Flemish communities were able to keep their profitable business, al-
though in hard competition with France and England. These two coun-
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tries wanted to snatch from the citizens of the Dutch Republic the 
privileges granted to them by the Spanish government (Pulido Bueno 
1993). It is a fact that the inability of Spain to supply its colonies with 
products that were in growing demand greatly favored collaboration 
between foreign and Spanish merchants, since the latter were forced to 
buy goods from foreign middlemen from North European firms in 
order to be shipped in the American fleets. It is estimated that in the 
first half of the 17th century, the profit share, in silver, on the return 
fleets from America was as follows: Holland: 30%, France: 25-30%, 
Genoa: 10%, England: 5-10%; the remaining 25 to 30% of the silver 
stayed in Spain (Everaert 1973: 239-294; Klooster 1998: 48). A war 
broke out, upsetting such arrangements: the War of Spanish Succes-
sion (1700-1714), bringing about two main consequences. Firstly, 
both English and French merchants were granted a series of privileges 
that brought them to a highly privileged position, second to none. 
Secondly, the Spanish government began a series of reforms which, 
although intended to strengthen the Spanish monopoly, were not 
enough to keep foreign interests away from Spanish cities and ports. 
Cadiz was a city where foreign merchants had generally developed 
and perfected a sophisticated series of symbiotic instruments of inte-
gration into society at all levels, especially economic and social. 
Through such symbiosis, for Flemish and Dutch communities, even 
though they had been pushed away from their top position, was nearly 
business as usual. In the year 1713, when the Peace of Utrecht was 
signed, Cadiz merchants eagerly expected the forthcoming implemen-
tation of certain commercial treaties that would undoubtedly bring 
them back their former privileges (as we can see from the explanation 
given by Martín Guillermo Van Hemert, consignee in May of that 
year of the Dutch ship The Jorge and Isabel).7 
 
                                                     
7  Shipping in El Jorge e Isabel, Cádiz, May 1713, AHPC, PN 9/1576, 398; Con-
tract, Proxies and attestaties, 1713-1725, GAA, NA 5881/1447, 6033/1353,  
622, 1377; 6485/715; 6052/1683; 4656/465; 4632/654; 6033/1582; 5975/718; 
4658/218. 
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4. Trade in Cadiz in the 18th century: mechanisms and legal 
strategies 
As I have already shown in my works, the route between Amsterdam 
and Cadiz was the mainstay of this integration of economic spaces 
between the north and the south of Europe. It was also the main trade 
link connecting the Europeans and Hispanic America. This was some-
thing of a paradox, as Cadiz was the headquarters of the Spanish insti-
tutional monopoly with America, as well as the naval base for the 
fleets, galleons and register ships. Although trading activities in the 
city were closely monitored by the Spanish administration for foreign 
trade, it was there where most foreign merchants trading with America 
could be found. The studies on foreign presence in Cadiz are nowa-
days very numerous and illustrative. There is a wealth of examples of 
the mechanisms and the nature of a trade that is probably very similar 
to that carried out by so many foreign colonies in many other port 
cities in Atlantic Europe. 
Cadiz-based Dutch trade originated in the port of Amsterdam, 
which was the entrepot par excellence where all northern European 
trading firms were based, making this city the international financial 
and trading center of the time. After the turning point that the route 
between Amsterdam and Cadiz went through in the final years of the 
War of Spanish Succession (between 1709 and 1714 approximately), 
maritime connection between both ports began to recover. It happened 
thanks to the regular line of the fleet of the Amsterdam and Middel-
burg Society of Oriental Trade, or Levantse Handel, institutionally 
framed in several previous agreements between the Spanish Monarchy 
and the States Generals. The Society would fit out and inspect a con-
voy bound for Southern Spain and the Admiralty of Amsterdam would 
oversee the whole process. There is a wealth of information about how 
this commercial route was organized. It is to be found both in Amster-
dam and Cadiz, where there are countless freight contract documents.8 
At a time when the decadence of Mediterranean commerce became 
apparent, this very AmsterdamCadiz route linked with other regions 
and more attractive markets. The official connection between Cadiz 
                                                     
8  Reports by Dutch Consuls from Cadiz Comptoir, 1713-1778, NADH, LH 173-
174; Crespo Solana (2000: 21-32). 
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and America forced many businesses previously trading with Eastern 
areas, to relocate their contacts and partners to American ports. 
The route between Amsterdam, Cadiz and the American ports was 
fundamental for Dutch commercial firms. There is a very interesting 
document that offers an important valuation of this route: the reports 
on the Spanish fleet attacked and wrecked near Vigo in 1702. This 
year meant a crucial moment in the political context, as the Anglo-
Dutch alliance had declared war on Spain. The best part of commer-
cial houses in Amsterdam showed their dissatisfaction at such war 
actions on a country in which they had strong commercial interests. 
Those firms sent their goods to American ports on board the Spanish 
fleets. The value of such cargoes ranged between 500 and 2,000 flo-
rins for each firm. Since such fleets always left from the Bay of Cadiz, 
agents there for those Amsterdam-based commercial firms stored 
goods for their bosses and sent them out when ordered. On August 15, 
1702, the ports and towns of Rota and El Puerto de Santa María, in the 
Bay of Cadiz, were raided by an Anglo-Dutch fleet. The Spanish fleet 
sailing back from America, initially bound for Cadiz, was forced to 
seek shelter at the port of Vigo, in Northern Spain. A second Anglo-
Dutch fleet waylaid the Spanish ships; most ships were wrecked and 
sunk. After the event, an inventory was made. We can gather from it 
that Dutch firms did not approve of a war that jeopardized their com-
mercial interests, as the losses to be made in this type of naval disas-
ters were huge.9 It is possible, in the light of some sources, to make an 
approximate valuation on this trade starting from Utrecht. But before 
that, a description of its nature is needed. 
Upon a study of the characteristics of Cadiz-based, Flemish and 
Dutch commercial companies, what first springs to mind is their high 
degree of complexity. This is due to a long process of integration into 
local society, at levels far exceeding the merely economic. As the 
main reason for the massive arrival of foreigners in Cadiz was their 
involvement in the American trade, most members of the Flemish and 
Dutch colonies were merchants (34.8%). Very often, Flemish families 
already settled served as welcome centers for many small and medium 
                                                     
9  Inventories of shipments to New Spain, June 20, 1720, Thomas Coghen and 
Diego Van Havre, GAA, NA 5672/1454-1458; Inventory of the fleet at Vigo, 
NADH, LH 279; Kamen (1966). 
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merchants coming from the merchant and manufacturing cities of the 
Republic, as they arrived in Cadiz intending to make profitable busi-
ness. In the decades following the Peace of Utrecht, a new migratory 
wave of Flemings and Dutch citizens into the Bay of Cadiz took place. 
Very soon, there will be a sharp rise in Flemish businesses, coinciding 
with the relocation of the Casa de la Contratación, the Spanish Board 
of Trade, from Seville to Cadiz. There was also a steep rise in mari-
time traffic from this port since 1715. It is worth noting, nevertheless, 
the open rivalry between English, French and Flemish merchants, as 
well as the predominance reached now by British trade, which practi-
cally superceded the United Provinces in its economic relationship 
with Spain (Pulido Bueno 1993: 37-80; Crespo Solana 2001: 128).  
The strategies of Cadiz-based Flemish and Dutch businesses bear 
a strong resemblance with those developed by other communities of 
this nationality settled in other geographical areas of Europe, such as 
the Baltic and the Mediterranean.10 The interrelated group of mercan-
tile and financial activities was carried out, generally, within a particu-
lar legal framework, i.e., the commercial company. The way trade was 
organized was very much like the way the networks of correspondents 
and maritime routes were connected. That way, the existence of a 
commercial firm provided the companys internal cohesion. Besides, 
the organization of such companies was very similar to other firms 
of correspondents or agents. Their evolution and dynamics, although 
fluctuating, were stable in the long run. Centralization of the net-
works, together with their extent, allowed capital to flow and to be 
deposited for credit purposes in the cities for later use. Techniques and 
mercantile practices carried out in such activities did not experience a 
great evolution in time. Deposit of money, commission, currency ex-
change, insurance, as well as the various occupations related with 
maritime transport were some of the key aspects on which the organi-
zation system of these companies was based. 
Two fundamental pillars, i.e., the goederenhandel or warenhandel 
(trade of goods) and the deposit of money in the towns, were two in-
trinsically related aspects. They were essential for merchants in con-
nection with the American market, as they enabled them to store an 
amount of goods to be loaded in the fleets bound for New Spain as 
                                                     
10  Engels (1997); Veluwenkamp (2000); Weber (2004); García Fernández (2005).  
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well as on the register ships that set sail regularly to various ports 
around the Caribbean and to the mainland. The reason for the credit 
deposits was to maintain the trade of goods, since the best part of such 
goods was brought in the fleet of the Levantse Handel (Crespo Solana 
2000: 32-36). Founded in June 1625, this society specified in its regu-
lations that a branch should be set up in Cadiz, where merchants and 
correspondents or agents, both in Amsterdam and in Cadiz, should pay 
a series of taxes in order to guarantee the legality of this trade. This 
Dutch Oriental convoy began to arrive in Cadiz annually, coinciding 
with the time of the year when preparations were made for the depar-
ture of the fleets and galleons arranged by the Spanish Board of Trade. 
The relationship between goods and deposit of money was very 
important. It was also the means to check the consignees effective-
ness in the port: ships loaded with goods freighted by a commercial 
firm arrived at the destination port where the consignee was the firms 
agent. He would then store the merchandise and would go on to sell it 
and redistribute it. He would also pay the business overheads at port 
and keep the money that was not his own, in deposit, to be used later 
as instructed by his partner. The accounts would be settled when the 
supplier thought it to be appropriate, or at certain important moments 
in the life of any of the partners, such as a wedding or a death. Some 
documental types, such as the inventories of bankruptcies, although 
not very abundant, give us details of how the storages or the deposits 
were carried out, and how the payments between suppliers and buyers 
were made. In these indirect businesses, Dutch merchants played a 
pivotal role as middlemen regarding the capital flow between the mar-
ketplace  Cadiz  and the financial capital  Amsterdam. That way 
this coming and going of money and goods would go round full circle. 
It all happened despite the fact that, sometimes, many years would 
have to lapse between the beginning and the completion of a business 
with America through Cadiz. In most cases, such deposit accounts 
would be opened in Cadiz, with the purpose of storing both capital 
and merchandise, in locations near the ports of the Bay of Cadiz, des-
tined to the ships bound for America. Warehouses were located in 
Cadiz and in El Puerto de Santa María, and their keepers would regu-
larly send out the merchandise, either in their own name or in some-
one elses, whether in the fleets or on the register ships. The way such 
deals were conducted hinders any calculation of the volume of goods 
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shipped and received by the Dutch community in Cadiz; and the same 
applies to all other foreign communities. But it is a known fact that the 
structure of those exchanges was substantially invariable, i.e., the ex-
port of Spanish fruits, raw materials (such as wool), wine and colonial 
produce in exchange for the import into Spain of textile and other 
manufactures that would then be shipped to America. Such was, in 
essence, the basis of this traditional economic relationship. According 
to some specialists in Economy of the Low Countries during the 17th 
and 18th centuries, towards 1700, between 150 and 200 ships every 
year would cover the route between Amsterdam and Cadiz, and would 
load up to 30% of the silver that arrived in Cadiz from America.11 
The documents found in the General Archive of the Indies in 
Seville are completely complementary to the notarial documents from 
the municipal archives in Amsterdam and Cadiz. That is why it is 
feasible to make a general and approximate assessment of the evolu-
tion of this trade since 1713. The fluctuation of profits is closely re-
lated to the commercial flow that Dutch merchants kept with the 
American ports. It is also related to the flow of Cadiz economy itself. 
The general tendency of participation in the fleets, galleons and single 
register ships is shown in Figure 1 below. This figure has been drawn 
from the building of a database of register ships as well as the cono-
cimientos of goods signed by those merchants involved in the fleets 
and register ships bound for the Indies (The conocimientos were a 
kind of notarial deed listing and describing the type of goods shipped 
by a merchant and their value). 
 
                                                     
11  Dienstcontract, GAA, NA 2942/520; AHPC, PN 9/1578, 342; Sée (1926: 190).  
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Figure 1: Dutch participation in fleets, galleons, and register ships 
Source: Register Ships, 1713-1778, Books of Registers from the Casa de la Contra-
tación, AGI, CC 1281-1284; Conocimientos (Knowledgement) of merchandises, 
AHPC, PN, Notarías 5, 9, 15, 19, 23. 
 
There is deep controversy over the amount of precious metals col-
lected on return of the fleets from America in order to be transported 
to the Low Countries. Relevant available data are scattered through-
out. Nevertheless, we will mention the data collected by Morineau and 
García-Baquero from the Gazettes of Amsterdam, because of their 
interest. There are further available data from Spanish sources that 
show evidence of the Dutch ability to obtain American silver, even 
after 1700. In fact, the amount of metal that arrived to Amsterdam was 
very high. Such quantities explain, to a great extent, the high quantity 
of silver in circulation in the Low Countries. In fact, there was a great 
surplus, in spite of the large amounts of it that flowed to the East. This 
situation had a strong influence on both the great financial peak of 
Amsterdam and its serious cycles of crises that began in 1720 (Mori-
neau 1985: 351-549; Pol 1985; García-Baquero González 1996: 203-
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266). However, profits obtained by Cadiz-based Dutch traders were, 
comparatively, much smaller than those obtained by the French. 
France, together with England, had found a way very deeply into the 
Spanish markets. Both countries together obtained almost 42% of the 
silver registered on the return ships (Klooster 1998: 46). Between 
1721 and 1740, when the reforms carried out by the Administration of 
Phillip V were implemented, it became apparent to foreign merchants 
that they would have to use the classic convoys of fleets and galleons 
for their commercial purposes. Those were very difficult years, until 
late in the 1730s, due to several causes: firstly, the crisis suffered by 
Europe because of the War of Spanish Succession; secondly, the old 
recurring problems of the Spanish merchant navy, in serious need of 
encouraging ship-building  this was the main reason for the creation 
of the Intendencia General de Marina (or General Administration for 
the Navy). Everything contributed to a slump in the fitting-out of the 
fleets, bearing a strong negative influence in private trade. There was 
a further underlying problem that explains the recession curve in the 
participation of the Dutch in the ships for the Indies: a sharp rise in 
direct participation by England, as well as the strong competition 
posed by the members of the British colony in Cadiz. Besides, fleets 
and galleons in those years were very badly affected by misfortune: a 
great deal of high sea accidents and shipwrecks, combined with the 
need for long stays at American ports, which delayed return trips be-
tween 20 months and 5 years. There are multiple testimonies of the 
damage caused in the purses of Cadiz-based foreign merchants. As a 
knock-on effect, these had to delay payments to their partners in the 
North.12 However, the largest amounts of gold and silver recorded as 
having arrived in Europe, according to the Gazettes, are for the 1720s. 
At the same time, there was an increase in the involvement of Flem-
ings and Dutch in the fleets and galleons.  
It is possible to make an assessment of the peak years of such in-
volvement, insofar as the number of ships freighted, and the goods 
and products bound for America. We can tell from Figure 1 that the 
highest level of involvement in fleets and galleons happened around 
1717, when trade tribunals were relocated from Seville to Cadiz. It 
                                                     
12  Cases described in AHPC, PN 9/1589, 661-666; 23/5317, 703; 9/1578, 306; 
GAA, NA 11457/109; 11374/129. 
Ana Crespo Solana 124
was also a time when a high number of fleets were fitted out and sent 
(such as that in 1720, where a great number of Flemish and Dutch 
merchants were involved). The main way to trade with America via 
Cadiz was to load goods in the fleets and galleons. The level of in-
volvement in the second half of the 17th century and in the first part of 
the 18th century was very high. But the Anglo-Spanish War in 1739 
negatively affected all Cadiz trade. In those years, Dutch merchants 
began to suffer stiff competition by the English in the Bay of Cadiz. 
Here is a fact: in 1734 only 147 Dutch ships anchored in the bay. That 
was only 14.6% of the total for that year; there were 596 English ships 
and 228 French ones (Klooster 1998: 57). It was very often that for-
eign Cadiz-based merchants had to use English and French ships, as 
there was a shortage of Dutch vessels available in the bay at certain 
times. This kind of situation had been unheard of in previous times.13 
 
5. The route to America: examples of networks and vested  
business interests 
How can we describe the intrinsic nature of these networks? The only 
way to do it is by analyzing several examples within a theoretical 
framework that includes sociological premises as well as historical 
anthropological premises (Baud 1994: 83). For instance, when we 
look at the cooperation between Flemish and Dutch traders in Cadiz, 
their close ties between 1720 and 1740 become apparent. Other com-
munities also took part in the game, included the natives, who doubt-
lessly made handsome profits from the foreigners. Flemish-Dutch 
cooperation began to falter late in the 1750s. Their common interests 
started to break apart even at their home countries, possibly due to the 
political crisis originated by the Orangist Revolution and the political 
shift that occurred in the Southern Provinces. Although this theory 
still remains to be proven, there is some documental evidence (Serruys 
2006). Whereas the Flemings in Cadiz were more interested in rein-
forcing direct trade with Flemish ports such as Ostend, Dutch traders 
in Cadiz continue with the strategy of introducing their ships of the 
Levant fleet as register ships bound for America. Such strategy 
                                                     
13  Statement by Joseph Gadeyne in 1748, AHPC, PN 25/5338, 120.  
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seemed to reach very high levels in the 1740s and the 1750s (see Fig-
ure 1). 
For the most, the structure and connections of the networks that 
Cadiz-based Flemish and Dutch merchants had spread all over the 
American ports cannot be fully depicted, although several instances 
can be shown. Broadly speaking, such networks would link many 
Dutch commercial activities in Cadiz with those American harbors 
that were not directly connected to Amsterdam. Powers of proxy 
granted by Dutch traders to Flemings, Spaniards and other agents ap-
pointed in American ports provide a great deal of information regard-
ing such commercial ties. Most of such documents were drawn up in 
order to ensure the selling at the American ports of all the merchan-
dise on board the register ships and in the fleets and galleons (Bustos 
Rodríguez 1994: 155-169). Business would remain to be profitable for 
as long as the frequency of the fleets would allow it and providing that 
the networks would remain fully operational. The main American 
connections for Dutch traders in Cadiz were as shown in Table 1 be-
low. 
 
Table 1: Main American ports related with Dutch trade from Cadiz 
(1689-1730) 
Ports Number of ships 
Cartagena 22 
Mainland (1) 44 
La Guaira /Caracas   8 
Veracruz 48 
Portobelo 26 
Tabasco   2 
Buenos Aires 14 
El Callao   2 
Maracaibo (2)   4 
Santa Marta   2 
Source: Books of registro ships between 1717-1740, Pliegos y Reglamentos de Regis-
tros de venida, 1717-1778, AGI, CC 1281-1284. This survey has been compared 
with the notarial documents of the AHPC, PN, Notaría 9 (deeds for the years 
1690-1729). 
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It is necessary to highlight that many ships bound for Tierra Firme  
 the mainland  arrived at several harbors not shown in the table. 
These ships sailed within the fleets of Galleons. It is also worth noting 
the low number of trips to destination ports that, nevertheless, were 
very commonly used by Dutch fleets in their direct trade from the 
Republic. Such ports were Caracas and La Guaira. They were, to-
gether with other islands and continental ports around the Caribbean 
area (such as Puerto Rico), usual operation centers for both Dutch 
smugglers and those Flemish and Dutch merchants that came from 
Cadiz during the years of the War of Spanish Succession. Most of the 
trade in this area was actually illegally undertaken, and it was never 
officially verified or recorded. Nevertheless, many of those merchants 
that had by then settled in those smuggling centers carried on operat-
ing as partners of the merchants from Cadiz. From them they received 
cargoes of goods to be sold, and they sent back produce, such as co-
coa, straight to Spain on the return ships, without having to go by the 
warehouses in Amsterdam (Emmer 2001). 
There were many vested interests in the merchants involvement 
in the fleets and galleons. Since Cadiz was a gateway to America, a 
great deal of commercial firms regarded the American markets as 
suitable for more lucrative business (more profitable certainly than the 
trade carried out by the Levantse Handel with the Mediterranean 
ports). Sadly, it is not possible to find out whether this trade with 
Spanish America via Cadiz was higher than direct trade from the ports 
of the Republic, or indeed higher than that carried out mainly from its 
own Caribbean colonies. Despite the ban, it is known that a great 
number of ships that left Amsterdam under the flag of the States Gen-
erals crossed the ocean bound for the Spanish territories overseas. 
This could happen either deliberately or because of bad weather and 
wrong winds. On many occasions, such as the case of the Veleta 
Marija in 1746, the ship put in at Cadiz and then at Tenerife, before 
crossing the Atlantic towards Cartagena, Buenos Aires or Caracas.14 
However, more often than not, once arrived in Cadiz as part of the 
fleets of the Levantse Handel, those Dutch ships, after a convenient 
change of name, would be registered as galleons or into the Spanish 
fleets bound for America. How were they able to do this? Obviously 
                                                     
14  Ship loaded in Amsterdam by Jan Smidts in 1746, NADH, LH 173. 
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with the help from Spanish merchants, from Flemings settled in Cadiz, 
or indeed once given the green light by the officials of the Board of 
Trade, who also took part in this illegal game.  
Although there are no definite quantitative data, Dutch involve-
ment in the fleets, galleons and register ships could have been very 
high as well as highly diversified, ranging from operations such as the 
underwriting of policies of marine risk, to appointing a testaferro or 
front man, as well as all the other usual commercial activities. There 
are reports showing that in the 1720s, a high percentage of the trade 
with the ports of Havana, Veracruz and Cartagena de Indias was car-
ried out by Dutch shipping from Cadiz. Interestingly, though, in Por-
tobelo, fierce competition from the French meant that hardly any other 
European nation was able to trade at this port. As an example of the 
predominance of the Dutch, it is worth recalling that firms from the 
Low Countries monopolized the trade in certain products such as co-
coa or cochineal. It was also them who exported most fabrics and tex-
tile manufactures to the ports of Spanish America, just as they did in 
the 17th century (Everaert 1973: 372-379; García-Baquero González 
1976, I: 324-325). As far as the re-export business is concerned, they 
brought to Europe products such as indigo, quinine and other drugs, as 
these were not available in their own overseas centers.  
In the first decades of the 18th century, Dutch merchants re-
directed goods on board the fleets and galleons. And it was done ei-
ther in the name of the ships captain, of the ship master, or in the 
name of a trustworthy agent or consignee. There are testimonies of 
some of these consignments, sent mainly in the 1720s by highly repu-
table Cadiz-based Flemish families. It is highly likely that, without the 
help of these families, the fleets would have not overcome the crisis 
experienced early in the century. For instance, the fleet of New Spain 
arranged by Fernando Chacón, set sail with a cargo of textile goods 
worth about 371,777 silver reales, freighted mainly by the Coghen y 
Montefrío family and in the name of Joseph of Leyza.15 Other Cadiz-
based merchants loaded ships on their own behalf. Such was the case 
of Francisco Joseph Van Hemert, loading in the fleets of the 1720s 
and up to the 1760s, to a total of 16,091 palmos, and an equivalent 
amount of wine and spirits. It is generally possible to depict almost all 
                                                     
15  Declaration of Beatríz Jacome, February 1, 1723, AHPC, PN 5/996, 36. 
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these traders from Cadiz in a similar way as Van Hemert, born into a 
family originally from Haarlem (García-Mauriño Mundi 1999: 304). 
They were exporters of textile products and metals, and only occa-
sionally of agrarian products, as the latter were, as it has been said, 
merchandise for the Europe-bound return ships. And there are no indi-
cations to demonstrate that the involvement was different from that 
described here. Most of the time, the Dutch dealt only in manufac-
tured products.  
Second and third generations of Dutch and Flemings became 
completely Spanish. This process was advantageous not only to them-
selves, but also to their relatives trading firms in the Low Countries, 
as the latter used to trade through the former. That was the reason why 
Flemings were always the first citizens to be accused of contravening 
the main prohibition of the Spanish monopoly, i.e., to receive com-
mands from foreigners. Flemish descendents were granted a good deal 
of licenses by the Casa de la Contratación. Such licenses allowed 
them not only to load goods but also to travel on board the fleets and 
galleons. But this was only a part of the connection between Cadiz 
and America carried out by Dutch businesses. On many occasions 
there have been mentions of a kind of indirect involvement, character-
ized mainly for being an illegal, undercover activity. One of such fre-
quent ways to take part was that that involved a testaferro or Spanish 
agent or middleman that loaded the fleets with goods stored on behalf 
of or brought into the city by foreigners. All foreign merchants were 
able to appreciate the importance of Cadiz as a money depot, a ware-
house and an information center. All the above explains the existence 
of such a great deal of documents from the notarial offices in Cadiz 
stating the true identity of the owners of the merchandise loaded onto 
the ships. The most appropriate thing to do is to explain this involve-
ment exactly as the merchants themselves described it, although there 
were only a very few cases when the merchants admitted how they 
engaged in such trade. Christian Duisbergh embarked, on the galleons 
arranged by the Conde de Casa Alegre, a frangote of merchandise in 
the name of Juan Arteaga y Ochoa, on whose behalf the receipt was 
signed at the foot of the invoice by Cristóbal de Barrabarzena, who 
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was his consignee.16 Since the consignee had died, the trade officials, 
by virtue of the contents of the invoice, collected the capital belonging 
to the Dutchman from the Consulate of Cadiz, worth 5,446 pesos and 
5 reales. Before his death, Juan of Arteaga had secretly signed a deed 
for the same amount, with Joseph of Iriarte as the beneficiary, who 
should hand in the money to Duisbergh. Apparently, this Dutch mer-
chant had various other sums of money deposited in the Consulate by 
way of invoices for goods sent to America in different fleets or on 
register ships.  
This kind of collaboration between Flemish and Dutch merchants 
in Cadiz was on the increase since 1720. But in 1740, the implementa-
tion of the system of single register ships meant a reinforcement of the 
alliance between both colonies with the idea of embarking a high 
amount of merchandise. The implementation of such system would 
help Dutch merchants to profit again from the gold and silver that 
arrived in Cadiz, as they were heavily involved with most Cadiz-based 
Flemings who would serve them as storekeepers for capital on deposit 
and merchandise. The money was used to finance cargoes bound 
for the Indies. According to the information found in the newspaper 
Amsterdam News, the highest percentage of gold and silver from 
America (in libras tornesas and in piastras, although no figures are 
quoted) between 1748 and 1753 came from New Spain; Lima and 
Cartagena also sent a great deal  with similar amounts quoted for 
each , as well as Buenos Aires and Caracas. These harbours were the 
ones most frequented by Cadiz traders from the Low Countries in 
those years (Morineau 1985: 381). Register ships were an interesting 
alternative to the system of fleets, although there were many risks 
involved. Battles in the Atlantic always posed a threat for register 
ships, and such trips were likely to end up as shipwrecks or to be the 
victims of attacks. Although in 1754 the system of fleets was restored, 
there are few indications that Dutch merchants began to use them as 
before, and the use of register ships continued to be the preferred way, 
as shown in Figure 1. This spectacular growth could have been en-
couraged by a new era of hegemony for Dutch trade in Cadiz. In the 
1750s and 1760s, the number of Dutch ships in the Bay of Cadiz 
                                                     
16  Will by Christian Duisburg, a Catholic trader from Amsterdam but residing in 
Cadiz, March 11, 1738, AHPC, PN 2/371. 
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seemed to grow (up to 155 or 38.1%) just as there was a sharp decline 
in the number of English and French ships. The likely reason for it 
could be the battles in the Atlantic, on which both England and France 
had to focus, driving them away from the commerce in Cadiz during 
the Seven Years War and leaving Holland as the sole nation capable 
of concentrating on it.17  
 
Table 2: Gold and silver brought into the Republic from Cadiz 
Year Amounts in pesos escudos Amounts in florins 
1758 1,670,000 - 
1759 2,920,000 300,000 
1760 4,770,000 3,900,000 
1761 1,110,000 180,000 
1762 - 1,200,000 
Source: Report, 1762, AGS, Estado 6338. 
 
The problems in the American colonies were a reflection of this ri-
valry in the very heart of the Spanish monopoly. In 1759, the members 
of the Amsterdam firm Pierre and Stephanus Locquet seemed to re-
flect such situation when they granted a power of proxy to the Cadiz 
firm Verduc & Vincent Co, in order to collect goods to be loaded onto 
the Dutch ship De Vreede. This ship had been captured in Jamaica by 
English corsairs. Such incidents were also noticeable in Port au Prince 
as well as in other Caribbean ports. All this trouble switched attention 
away from Cadiz, and the Dutch seemed to concentrate on American 
ports. There was a great deal of trouble for Anglo-Dutch trade in Car-
ibbean ports during the Seven Years War.18  
It has been said that this active involvement was somehow sus-
tained by the close collaboration with the Spaniards. Obviously, in 
such a problematic historical context, negotiating through Spanish 
middlemen was one of the main ways to gain access to the American 
silver loaded in the return fleets. One of the widespread tactics was to 
secretly load goods on the ships bound for the Indies straight from the 
                                                     
17  Reports on Dutch ships in Cadiz, 1758-1763, AGS, Estado 6338, 6364.  
18  Statement on February 28, 1759, GAA, NA 11380/162; January 15, 1760, GAA, 
NA, 10291/38; AHPC, PN 23/5334, 160-162. 
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Dutch ships anchored in the Bay of Cadiz. On return of the fleets, the 
same strategy would be used, loading the silver straight onto Dutch 
ships that would then set sail as part of the convoy to Amsterdam. 
Using a middleman or testaferro was perfectly accepted by Dutch 
firms  as they shamelessly stated in 1716  in order to avoid mer-
chandise and precious metals to be confiscated by the Spanish authori-
ties. This strategy poses one of the main difficulties, making it impos-
sible to quantify Dutch trade with America. According to them, all 
invoices, conocimientos and consignments of products belonging to 
Dutch or to other Cadiz-based foreign merchants that are to be sent to 
Spanish America must always be drawn in the name of a Spaniard. 
And it was added that this was a necessary practice in order to avoid 
the confiscations of goods.19 The procedure was as follows: mer-
chants would sell their products to a Spanish merchant that would 
make a part payment in advance. The balance went on credit, usually 
through a contract of marine risk.  
These practices would normally work perfectly, unless misfortune 
struck, which would hinder the arrival of the profits at the hands of the 
actual owner of the merchandise. In the already mentioned case of 
Christian Duisbergh, in 1738, the shipment of goods for America was 
declared as belonging to Juan of Arteaga y Ochoa, a Cadiz citizen and 
a member of the Order of Santiago. This course of action was neces-
sary as the grantor is not allowed because he is of a foreign nation.20 
In such cases, foreign merchants could be hit by unpleasant news: the 
seizure of their gold and silver in service to the Crown. These con-
fiscated goods, however late, would almost invariably be returned to 
their owners, plus any interest accrued. On certain occasions, the 
money seized by the Crown was returned as an amount, or license, of 
tons, which, paradoxically, seemed to set the wheel of interests in 
motion again. The involvement in the register ship was, maybe, the 
most lucrative business. Although this type of shipment had a prece-
                                                     
19  Statement on July 14, 1716, GAA, NA 5821A/ 556: Philippe Courtier, Fran-
cisco Van Hemert, Frederick Mandt, Francesco de Roy, Isaac Rutgers en Jean de 
portier, kooplieden in Amsterdam, verklaren, dat de facturen, connossementes en 
consignatiën der goederen van Nederlandse of andere buitenlandse kooplieden, 
welke uit Cadiz, naar de Spaanse Westindiën altijd gaan op de namen van 
Spaanse onderdanem, Dit gebruik was nodig, omdat de goederen namens niet 
Spanjaarden séller geconfiskeerd warden.  
20  Codicil of March 11, 1738, AHPC, PN 2/371.  
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dent from the years immediately after the Peace of Munster (1648), in 
the 18th century it was perfected and its volume increased due to di-
verse institutional factors such as the implementation of the reform 
process in Spain. The main consequence of this process was, no doubt, 
the increase in register ships, which began to reach a higher number of 
American harbors.  
There was an endemic problem in Spain, which forced merchants 
to devise a specific strategy: the lack of Spanish shipbuilding produc-
tion. This problem meant that foreign ships had to be used in order to 
reach an adequate number of ships for the Spanish convoys to Amer-
ica. The use of Dutch transport, even necessary in this trade, made it 
possible for foreign merchants of all nationalities to include Dutch 
ships, having previously changed their name and sold them in Cadiz to 
Spanish and Flemish partners, as register ships to America. There is 
evidence to show that some Dutch companies received consignments 
on ships under Dutch flag loaded with diverse goods and whose car-
goes were immediately embarked on the naos for New Spain. Some-
times, a Dutch ship as a whole was registered for America. The opera-
tions carried out in this Amsterdam-Cadiz-America circuit can be 
proven in the description of some cases that took place in the 1750s 
and 1760s, as there is enough information available. 
However, it is so far impossible to quantify a practice that could 
be very habitual mainly due to the shortage of ships in the navies and 
the Spanish fleets. An example already described as follows. In 1767, 
the ship De Ludermina María, after arriving in Cadiz on behalf of 
Amsterdam merchant Michel Goris and in the name of his correspon-
dents De Somer & Van Rechem, set sail for Veracruz as a register 
ship as part of the fleet of New Spain.21 Her cargo was textiles. In 
such cases, Amsterdam firms conferred powers of proxy and sent 
money to their partners in Cadiz to enable them to include their ships 
in the despatch of the fleets. These ships set off with the same cargo 
(or maybe with new merchandise added in the Bay of Cadiz) heading 
for America. In a proxy of the year 1710, an order can clearly be seen 
with the purpose of sending goods on board the fleets to the Indies in 
the name of a correspondent. This correspondent either travelled on 
the ship as an agent or was already living in America, and was respon-
                                                     
21  July 24, 1767, GAA, NA 11457/109. 
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sible for the merchandise to be sold in the West Indies on behalf of 
Gaspar and Manuel Winjgaert.22  
The consignees found another appealing business, i.e., buying and 
selling Dutch ships, or even ships of other nationalities, to be later sent 
to America as single register ships convoyed by warships. The cases 
registered by notaries, although not very numerous, offer significant 
examples of direct commercial trips to America. Although some of the 
ships were not built in Dutch shipyards, they were all consigned to 
Cadiz-based Flemish or Dutch merchants, and were sold in the city. 
Such was the case of a ship from Genoa bought by Henrique de Roo 
and sons after buying a sailing license for the Indies. Or the case of 
the formerly English ship San Felipe, bought by Livino B. Van den 
Broucke, which sailed to Buenos Aires. Also bought in the bay was 
the ship from Hamburg La Galera del Naranjo Dorado.23 Shortly 
afterwards, Admiral Adrián Colarte became her proud owner, al-
though the galley had just arrived in Cadiz with a cargo of goods con-
signed to the Flemings Bellot and Warnck.24  
In general terms, the way a ship was sold in Cadiz was as follows: 
the agreed price was paid; sometimes a certain amount of money was 
included for the captain, together with, in some cases, a hat as a gift, 
although the gift could also be money.25 Besides, the alcabala  a kind 
of import tax  had to be paid, together with a 4% tax for the general 
Collection of Rents of the city. The payment of tax shows that the 
Spanish authorities were perfectly aware and informed of such trans-
actions.26 When the ship was sold in Cadiz, the terms of the repayment 
schedule was set by the freighter. For the most, having sold the whole 
ship with its cargo and crew meant actually keeping a fair share of the 
whole business of going to the Indies. In May 1743, Lorenzo Del 
                                                     
22  Quoted literally: om ze in West-Indie te verkopen ten behoere van Gaspar en 
Manuel Winjgaert; Proxy granted by the Wijngaert brothers to Gaspar de Con-
incq y co, Cadiz, Amsterdam, January 31, 1710, Merchandise was consigned to 
Diego Alonso Toscano, in Honduras, GAA, NA 2941/73 (see Crespo Solana 
2001: 79).  
23  AHPC, PN 23/5338, 140-46; AHPC, PN 23/5322, 456-460. 
24  Cases described in AHPC, PN 5/992, 5/1030, 9/1585, 9/1586, 9/1605, 16/3768, 
19/4452, 23/5338, 23/5322; GAA, NA 7965/55, 8048/17, 10453/755.  
25  Purchase of a ship by Adrián Colarte in 1743, AHPC, PN 23/5322, 456-460. 
26  Sale of the The Ana María Galley, of the captain Cornelio Leendertsz in 1743, 
AHPC, PN 9/1605, 299-300.  
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Arco, a Cadiz merchant, bought a ship from the Directie van de Le-
vantse Handel called The Ana María Galley. 36,000 florins was the 
asking price, inclusive of the load. Amsterdam merchant Louis Laer 
hired interpreter Jacob Jacobsenz on these instructions:  
[...] if you happen, although I doubt it, to find a gentleman inclined to the 
purchase of the ship with all her belongings save for the passport of Al-
giers, you should obtain for her 36,000 florins, average currency of Hol-
land, hard cash first thing and in no other way.  
The galley eventually fetched 32,000 florins (18,000 pesos escudos 
en plata vieja de a 128 cuartos).27  
Along the evolution of commerce in Cadiz, the peak was reached 
soon after the use of register ships became widespread; and foreign 
merchants were very much engaged in it.28 Commercial firms in Cadiz 
were also openly involved. The obvious reason for it was that register 
ships were much more regular than fleets and galleons from 1739 
onwards. Merchants enjoying special privileges as citizens of the 
Flemish nation were openly financially involved in the fitting out of 
the register ships. They used to appoint a manager to liaise with the 
consignee appointed by the register licensee in order to oversee all 
operations.29 Another way for Dutch traders to collaborate with the 
Spaniards has been called the supercargo by W. Klooster, where sev-
eral Spaniards joined forces in order to obtain a license for a shipment 
to the Indies. Foreign merchants introduced their products in the 
shipment after having given a loan to the Spanish licensees. Such par-
ticular way of trading was known as participation or sharing in the 
licenses of tons. Licensees were allowed to share in a ships cargo for 
a certain number of tons. They then did make those tons available in 
the open market. Dutch ships were often used. The Flemish consignee 
of the ship would have provided the Spaniards with the capital to pay 
the Administration for the license. This kind of mortgage-like loan 
entitled both the consignee and the captain of the ship to load mer-
chandise on their own ship. These loans also allowed the creditors to 
embark their own goods.  
                                                     
27  Cadiz, May 23, 1743, AHPC, PN 9/1605, 299-300.  
28  Proxy, Cadiz, May 23, 1743, AHPC, PN 9/1605, 299-300; García-Baquero Gon-
zález (1976: 163).  
29  Cadiz, January, 26, 1730, AHPC, PN 9/1593, 30. 
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On other occasions, a Dutch register ship would be made available 
to Cadiz merchants by her Flemish owner. Such was the case of 
Livino Bernardo van den Broeck, owner of the Ana María y San Féliz, 
captained by Joseph Félix de Flores, who was granted the kings per-
mission for a register ship to Cartagena. In February, 15.1748 the cap-
tain became the proxy for the owner, in charge of raising the capital 
needed for the trip.30 Such powers of proxy illustrate the existing obli-
gations between the captain of the ship and the owner of the register 
ship: the captain was fully accountable for all money, payments to 
officers and crew, hiring the crew for the return trip, as well as for the 
whole maintenance and upkeep of the ship. With regards to strictly 
commercial duties, the captain was responsible for delivering to the 
consignee the merchandise loaded on the ship on departure, exactly as 
stated in the register. Once in Cartagena, he requested the appropriate 
certificates from the royal officials. Both captain and consignee were 
also responsible for the sale of the goods.  
Regarding the financing side of this trade, it is worth noting that, 
from the great variety of services related with sailing and shipment, 
the Dutch and Flemish colonies were behind a great number of private 
loans. There was a gradual shift from the old fleets and galleons to the 
register ships, and an increased trade, which was fuelled with capital 
through private commercial loans and policies of marine risk. Table 1 
shows the evolution of such investments, taken from notarial docu-
ments which provided a wealth of information on these commercial 
loans. Marine risk policies included a mortgage, which was a very 
common practice in Cadiz and elsewhere in Spain, and in the rest of 
Atlantic and Mediterranean Europe. Some Dutch merchants, owners 
of ships that were part of convoys, or owners of cargoes and merchan-
dise loaded on those ships, requested loans to subscribe policies of 
marine risk. The premium was almost invariably payable on return to 
Cadiz in silver minted in America. For this operation, a Spanish corre-
spondent had to be appointed. Many verified cases show that the capi-
tal came mostly from the Flemings financial operations in Cadiz, 
acting as bankers for the deposit of capital, and the Dutch merchants 
involved in the Straatvaart route. The Flemish community in Cadiz 
invested capital, however irregularly, in the American trade by means 
                                                     
30  Proxy, Cádiz, February 15, 1748, AHPC, PN 25/5338, 92-96.  
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of this well-known financial instrument. This was a very usual type of 
contract in the trade with America, and its documental description has 
been so profusely dealt with that we will obviate it. From a total sam-
ple of 67 policies of marine risk, signed between 1717 and 1763, more 
than half were worth a minimum of 1,000 pesos escudos (52.2%). It is 
worth stating, however, that these loans were moderate when com-
pared to other contracts underwritten by merchants from the Bay of 
Cadiz. It appears that Flemish and Dutch merchants reaped largest 
profits from other types of financial services whose legal framework 
seemed to be similar to the risk. Flemish and Dutch bankers in Cadiz 
had large amounts of capital available to be invested partly on Ameri-
can trade. Commerce in Asia Minor was also targeted, as there is evi-
dence of capital deposits in the hands of Flemish bankers loaded onto 
ships of the VOC anchored in the Bay of Cadiz, before continuing 
journey to the oriental markets. Between Cadiz and Amsterdam a 
mechanism had been set in motion that produced a constant output of 
capital, going both ways. The Bay of Cadiz was a major center for 
redirecting gold and silver.  
Regarding the investments in the contracts of marine risks, the 
amount of the loan was linked to the value of the embarked merchan-
dise -usually textiles. The cargo owner also provided the capital. This 
type of contract was mostly a credit instrument, but it also specified a 
series of duties designed to feed the whole circuit of operations in 
order to keep the machinery going along certain business lines. Its use 
was widespread in the Amsterdam-Cadiz route. Local men could also 
be involved in raising the capital needed to conduct trade with Amer-
ica with the help from the Dutch. Marine risk was a very effective 
instrument for collecting American silver. The moneylender/under-
writer used to be the owner of the goods. He could either embark or 
sell the merchandise. Spanish masters, agents or correspondents, and 
captains, provided the legal framework for this trade. The lender also 
provided cash that went running the risk (corriendo riesgo) on the 
trip.31 Merchandise was thus insured by the lender as well as by the 
individuals involved in handling the goods, who would take it upon 
                                                     
31  Contract of riesgo marítimo (Maritime Risk) between Hercq & Vandentrille and 
Dionisio del Duque, Cádiz, October 8, 1726, AHPC, PN 9/1589, 661-666.  
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themselves to account for the safety of such effects or fruits.32 This 
way risk contracts and marine policies always sailed together on each 
and every ship bound for America. On return, profits gained with the 
merchandise or the silver meant canceling the policy and settling all 
accounts, fulfilling a whole cycle. Middlemen helped to guarantee the 
fulfillment of the cycle by storing and selling the goods. As far as the 
repayment schedule is concerned, it could take up to five years for 
capital and interests to reach the hands of the lender [...] as long as the 
merchandise sold well in America and middlemen and sailors were 
not struck by misfortune. Ships brought colonial products consigned 
to the underwriters of the policies. For instance, all register ships from 
Caracas brought cocoa consigned to several Flemish merchants. It 
could also happen that the contract of risk was applied to goods 
bought in America by the lender. A risk contract was worth 10 thirds 
of cloth outbound and three portions of cocoa worth a total of 4,903 
pesos homebound-value of the going risk. The cocoa would be loaded 
on the same ship and consigned to the lenders. Flemish merchant 
Guillermo of Wint received a cargo of coca on a register from Caracas 
on a full round trip. This is enough for illustration purposes.33  
Flemish and Dutch merchants financial involvement in trade in 
Cadiz by means of the contracts of marine risks started to diminish in 
the 1760s. There are only two policies from 1760 underwritten by the 
Fleming Alejandro Beyens, although he had cargoes in the fleets of 
later years. Also, one policy underwritten by another Fleming in 1768, 
six policies underwritten by the firm Hercq y Vandentrille in 1765, 
and five by Román Vienne in the fleets of 1774 and 1776 (Bernal 
1992: 592). It is worth noting again that the destination ports on these 
contracts generally implied a round trip. The port of Veracruz was the 
most frequented with 35.8% of the times. Then Portobelo (19.4%) and 
Cartagena de Indias (17.9%). The highest number of entries for fabrics 
from the Low Countries is also found in Veracruz. It seems that their 
minor presence in other ports, such as Buenos Aires, La Guaira or 
Maracaibo means that Flemish and Dutch merchants brought their 
goods to America on the register ships. The total figures amount to 
                                                     
32  Contract of riesgo marítimo (Maritime Risk) between Hercq & Vandentrille and 
Dionisio del Duque, Cádiz, October 8, 1726, AHPC, PN 9/1589, 661-666.; Bernal 
(1989: 288-313). 
33  Contract, Cádiz, July 2, 1723, AHPC, PN 19/4452, 638-39.  
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more than five million florins. Private loans were not always profit-
driven, as immersed in a society of wide interests. Besides funding 
American trade, Flemings and Dutch in Cadiz lent money to other 
foreign merchants just arrived in town.34 Other North European firms 
investing indirectly on the Cadiz market also borrowed money from 
them. Some companies hit by warfare and lack of trade resorted to 
them to raise capital. Running interest types ranged between 5 and 
8%. Cadiz had become a major financial center, complementary to 
Amsterdam. Cadiz was the main center for collecting gold and silver 
for Dutch bankers. It is not surprising then the keen interest shown by 
commercial firms in the Republic to keep the link with their relatives 
and friends and partners in Cadiz and their American businesses. This 
Cadiz connection explains, to a great extent, that precious metals kept 
being drained away from Spain and into the Dutchs hands throughout 
the 18th century. The great flexibility in loan repayment offered by 
Flemings and Dutch in Cadiz gave them ample room for manoeuvre 
as private bankers. Speculation was a main feature of marine trans-
port. That is why marine risk policies were inextricably linked to this 
kind of business. This financial instrument was perfected within Dutch 
commerce, as there was a long tradition in Antwerp and Bruges going 
back to the Middle Ages. Marine risk in the Southern Low Countries 
was, still in the 18th century, very similar to that in Amsterdam. Inter-
est rates and premiums varied depending on the geographical area and 
the juncture, ranging between 3 to 6% in the Atlantic and 4 to 7% in 
the Mediterranean. Foreign merchants also monopolized the insurance 
business in Cadiz in the second half of the 17th century. A proof of this 
is a document dated in 1688 on insurance policies and premiums pay-
able for trips to and from Cadiz, where clauses were to be decided on 
by representatives of the merchants. Throughout the 18th century, most 
business trips from, to or stopping over in Cadiz were insured in Am-
sterdam. However, there is little information on this kind of contract, 
as the only written evidence is found when shipwreck or other misfor-
tune prevented the insurers from collecting the premium. Interest in 
American market was notorious. Cadiz-based Flemish and Dutch 
merchants delegated in their correspondents the implementation of 
insurance policies on cargoes on board the fleets and register ships. 
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It is worth mentioning, as an example, the policy underwritten by 
Octavio Barbour, a member of the consulate of the Netherlands, which 
illustrates freight and insurance practices. In 1751, Barbour & Com-
pañía signed a policy worth 10,000 silver escudos, running the regular 
risk on a ship owned by the Fleming Livino Bernardo Van de 
Broucke. The ship sank off Corrientes Cape, which meant that around 
15,000 pesos escudos had to be paid by the underwriters to cover the 
loss of the ship and all its fittings. In March 1752, Barbour & Com-
pañía underwrote a policy covering a shipment owned by Spanish 
merchant Lorenzo del Arco, worth 233,691 reales on board the Nues-
tra Señora de la Esperanza. After the shipwreck, off a wild coast 
next to Rio Grande, in the vicinity of the port of Buenos Aires, loosing 
the entirety of the hulk and the cargo, and perishing the whole crew, 
the underwriters had to pay 7,360 pesos.35 
To sum up, whenever there was a possibility of speculative busi-
ness, merchants from all nationalities would engage in them, even 
Spaniards. Speculation in concessions of licenses of tons was some-
how arbitrary, as Spanish officials granted them in exchange for 
bribes or goods, in an attempt to fill up the ships and make such long 
and hazardous trips worthwhile. However far from quantifiable, such 
complex speculative network built around Cadiz trade had turned this 
city into a paradise for survival for all and sundry. 
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